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ABSTRACT 
Sean Olson 
Multifamily Historic Renovation: Developer Risks, Challenges, and Benefits 
(Under the direction of Dr. Lynn Fisher) 
 
Multifamily historic renovations are popular with local communities, because they 
help preserve a town’s history, revitalize disinvested areas, and provide a unique 
experience for tenants. Yet, despite these benefits and the availability of tax incentives, 
many developers refrain from undertaking historic renovation projects because of the 
many risks involved. This paper will identify and address some of these systematic risks 
through a series of interviews with real estate developers and professionals as well as a 
case study featuring a multifamily historic renovation. This methodology will identify 
some of the significant costs, lengthy development tasks, challenges of using historic tax 
credits, and the benefits of developing historic renovations. The goal of this thesis is to 
identify the challenges and potential benefits of historic renovations that differ from new 
construction projects and make recommendations to developers and public policy 
makers. 
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I.     OVERVIEW 
 Developers often seek ways to distinguish their product from the competition, 
sometimes through location or through the architectural and interior design. The last 
decade has seen an increase in consumer demand for architecturally unique spaces in 
the housing market (Hoffelder, 2003). Many developers have seized the opportunities 
that federal historic tax credits provide for historic renovations, reviving many run 
down, functionally obsolete buildings into unique and attractive spaces for retail, 
commercial, and residential use. Yet, historic renovations pose very unique challenges 
to developers, especially to those who are accustomed to the traditional process of 
greenfield, or new construction development. 1 Often, many old buildings considered 
for renovation have contaminated soil, are structurally unsound, and have certain 
design elements that present difficulty in adapting it to a new use. In addition, the 
allocation and monetization of historic tax credits has been under additional scrutiny 
by the IRS in recent years. All of these challenges are typically expensive and time 
consuming, leading many developers to avoid renovation projects all together.       
 Despite these challenges, historic renovations play an important part in 
rehabilitating urban centers. Particularly in America’s older cities, many historic 
buildings fall into disrepair and/or fail to provide any function in their current state. 
Deteriorated historic buildings often detract private investment and traffic in some 
cities’ most desirable downtown and urban areas. Due to federal historic tax credits 
and a historic renovation process called adaptive reuse, developers can rehabilitate 
                                                          
1 In contrast to renovating a historic building, greenfield development consists of developing a vacant 
parcel of land, and if necessary, demolishing the existing structure. 
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historic buildings and preserve their architectural character.2 This process enables a 
city to preserve its identity and its historic buildings to remain as landmarks for future 
generations to live and work in. In addition, historic renovations present excellent 
paradigms of sustainable building practices. Rather than building on the edge of urban 
areas, demolishing the existing structure and building from scratch, developers reuse 
the existing structure and infrastructure, reducing both the amounts of demolition 
waste and new building materials. 
 While my research pertains to historic renovations in general, I will place 
emphasis on the process of renovating historic buildings into residential spaces—
specifically multifamily, for-rent units. Multifamily housing has become popular in 
recent years due to demographic trends and economic changes. This increased supply 
of multifamily units in many American markets has spurred the need for developers to 
differentiate their product from the competition, and historic renovations provide that 
opportunity. Many tenants are attracted to historic renovations because they offer a 
unique living experience that is unavailable within new construction multifamily 
communities. As a result, multifamily historic renovations can be profitable ventures 
if developers can promptly identify and mitigate their risks during the development 
process. I will approach this research by identifying the risks, challenges, and benefits 
of historic renovations through a series of interviews with real estate professionals 
who work on historic renovations and a case study that features the specifics of an 
actual historic renovation project. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Adaptive reuse is taking an existing structure and making the necessary renovations to transform it for 
a new use. An example would be refitting an old 19th century cotton mill into a luxury apartment 
community. 
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A.  Research Question 
 The goal of this thesis is to provide a holistic picture of the challenges and 
benefits of historic renovations versus new construction projects from the viewpoint 
of a private developer.  Specifically, I will identify and analyze the timeline of 
development, types of financing, exit strategies, and regulatory risk unique to historic 
renovations in order to answer the question: how do development risks differ between 
historic renovations and new development of the same product type?  My goal is to 
further inform private developers and investors about historic renovations so they can 
better assess whether they have the capabilities and resources to mitigate the risks 
associated with historic renovations.  In addition, I hope to inform public policy 
makers of the risks of historic renovations in order to encourage greater incentives for 
private investment and development of historic renovations. I will also test my 
hypothesis that subsidies are necessary for making historic renovations financially 
feasible and for attracting private investment.  
 
B.  Reasons for Research 
 Since historic renovations may revive urban areas, help preserve historic 
landmarks, and be profitable ventures, developers and public policy makers will 
benefit from a greater understanding of these projects. Current research sheds little 
light on the unique risks developers assume when undertaking historic renovations. In 
addition, historic renovations have higher costs per square foot than new construction 
projects, and federal and state historic tax credits often play an essential role in 
making these renovations financially feasible. Thus, this study investigates the use of 
historic tax credits when discussing the risks and incentives that are relevant for all 
historic renovation projects. Since a court decision made in 2012 prompted the IRS to 
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issue new tax credit guidelines, this study carries particular relevance and addresses 
the implications of these changes. 
 
C.  Important Takeaways 
 Historic renovations incur regulatory risk, tax credit risk (if tax credits are 
used), development risk, and operational risk. These risks result in a number of 
challenges and benefits that developers need to weigh when considering a historic 
renovation project. Ultimately, a multifamily historic renovation can be a profitable 
venture if the developer: (a) finds a historic building whose existing design is suitable 
for multifamily housing and minimizes renovation costs; (b) conducts a thorough due 
diligence to arrive at a reasonable estimate of costs; (c) financially engineers the 
capital structure to effectively leverage the historic tax credits; (d) carefully 
strategizes the project’s exit strategy since the pool of investors who may want to 
purchase the building may be different and smaller than the pool of investors looking 
to purchase new construction projects; (e) creates a network of real estate 
professionals who are familiar with historic renovations; (f) manages the inflexibility 
risks that result from the long term holding requirement of historic renovations 
financed with HTCs. 
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II.     LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While my research focuses on multifamily historic renovations, I will cover 
historic renovations in general in my literature review. The current research on 
historic renovations focuses heavily on tax opinions regarding the historic tax credit 
process and the benefits for the local community, but it lacks information on 
significant costs, time-intensive elements, and risks with utilizing historic tax credits 
(HTCs). Contemporary research also fails to address the returns developers can expect 
from historic renovations. Business and real estate practitioner journal articles provide 
the bulk of research rather than strictly scholarly articles. This literature review will 
first provide a background and overview of the history of multifamily development 
and current trends, followed by the unique costs and challenges of historic 
renovations, the tax incentives and government regulations, and the benefits of 
historic renovations. 
 
A. History of Multifamily Development and Current Trends 
Multifamily development grew with the rise of suburban sprawl following 
World War II (Koch, 2006). Robert Koch (2006), a principal at a Florida architecture 
firm, describes how many apartment units in the 1960s were built in suburban 
locations, featured very few amenities, and were targeted toward adults without 
families. Yet, when the oil crisis of the 1970s and inflation occurred, commuting from 
suburbia and financing a home became more difficult for people (Koch, 2006).  Koch 
elaborates on the changes that occurred in the multifamily market following the 
economic downturn of the 1970s:  
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When the economy rebounded, the workforce of the world discovered a new 
dynamic: vertical movement in a profession or industry is not tied to a 
corporate commitment, but to mobility. You get your best job by going 
someplace else. 
 
So we saw, in the 1980s, the emergence of the renter by choice - an individual 
who wanted to live in a quality setting with nicely designed and nicely 
finished accommodations with someone else to clean the pool and mow the 
lawn. We saw the first inkling of a huge growth market in A and A++ rental 
and ownership product (para. 13-14). 
 
The renter by choice continues to be the driving force in the current multifamily 
market today. With developers trying to build multifamily communities with more 
luxurious amenities and appealing interior and exterior designs, historic renovations 
offer developers an opportunity to develop and present a unique product.   
 
B.  Unique Costs and Challenges 
Current research covers some of the unique structural challenges that historic 
renovations present to their developers. Often, the amount of needed rehabilitation 
can cause significant delays and increases in typical building costs. Even a historic 
building’s integral structure can cause complications when installing modern updates.  
Diana Mirel (2013) provides an example of a Minneapolis multifamily historic 
renovation project where the building’s columns presented challenges to installing 
modern updates like ductwork and electric lines. Because the building’s columns were 
considered essential to the building’s preservation, the developers had to shift the 
party walls and use drywall clouds to hide the ductwork and electric lines (Mirel, 
2013). This solution allowed the columns to stand alone, free from infringements, in a 
position where they could be aesthetically pleasing (Mirel, 2013). Another historic 
building under renovation in Seattle, WA, needed a hybrid heat pump system to heat 
and cool each apartment unit while allowing the original operable windows to provide 
ventilation (Wishkoski, 2006). Historic renovation developers need the ability to 
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compromise and find creative solutions when adding modern updates to a building 
undergoing a historic renovation.  
Complications like these can become even more stressful when they are 
considered to be a critical or landmark element of a building’s historical significance. 
Patricia Karlak (2000) writes about a developer obligated to finish the difficult task of 
preserving a building’s original stone tile facade. Presented with a task never achieved 
before, the developer had to save at least 75% of the 5,000 original tiles or else the 
city would halt construction and the project would be liable for liquidation (Karlak, 
2000). The high standards required the developer to spend time and money to ensure 
that the building’s façade was kept intact and was successfully incorporated into the 
new renovation. The historic society, the local government, and the community 
became partners, playing an active part in overseeing the developer’s rehabilitation 
work and holding him responsible in meeting their requirements (Karlak, 2000). This 
example represents the rigorous nature of many historic renovations: developers must 
not only account for the likelihood of such challenges, but they also need to be 
flexible enough to work with a number of different stakeholders.  
 
C.  Tax Incentives and Government Regulations 
When the government realized the potential economic benefits for local 
communities that historic renovations offered, they created an incentive to help drive 
their development. In 1976, the United States government recognized the value of 
preserving America’s older buildings and architecture and passed the Tax Reform Act 
(Indictor, 2013, p. 17). This legislation, specifically the Federal Rehabilitation Tax 
Credit for Certified Historic Structures, provides developers and investors with 
powerful financial incentives to pursue the difficult task of purchasing and renovating 
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historic structures and adapting them for new uses. Today, cities across America have 
seen their older buildings come to life due to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, although 
over the years both cities and proponents have formed varying opinions of tax credits.  
 Since the law’s inception in 1977, the federal tax credit has stimulated $60 
billion of private investments in historic renovations (Frish, 2012). Martha Frish 
(2012), a city planner and professor at the Art Institute of Chicago, claims that while 
these tax credits have promoted investment and preservation of older U.S. buildings, 
many developers have been reluctant to undertake such projects due to some shortfalls 
with the current legislation. Some of the proposed solutions to the legislation’s 
shortcomings include raising the 20% credit cap, loosening leasing restrictions and 
lowering the 50 year age requirement (Frish, 2012).  
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made a recent ruling in 2012 
on a case called Historic Boardwalk Hall which also created a challenge for historic 
renovation developers and tax credit-receiving investors. The Third Circuit’s ruling 
stated that in order for a historic tax credit investor to receive a project’s HTCs, they 
need to “have a clear stake in the economic success of the property they are investing 
in” (Anderson, 2013). In other words, the tax credit investor did not sufficiently share 
in the upside potential and downside risk of the project. Shortly after the ruling, the 
tax credit community had a mixed reaction. Some real estate professionals felt the 
implications of the Historic Boardwalk case had little effect on the tax credit market. 
In an interview with Plante & Moran, John Leith-Tetrault felt that investors would not 
leave the HTC market due to the Historic Boardwalk ruling: 
…we haven’t heard anyone announce that they’re getting out of this line of 
business. In fact, some of the industry’s largest investors have said that they 
feel their approach pre-Boardwalk was conservative that they don’t expect to 
make many adjustments to their credit policies. The market in general has 
reacted relatively calmly (as cited in Historic Boardwalk Hall, 2012). 
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Yet, other real estate professionals felt that the Historic Boardwalk Case negatively 
impacted the tax credit market. Jacobs (2013) writes, “not only has [it] had a chilling 
effect on new investments in historic rehabilitation, it has raised significant concerns 
as to the Service’s audit intentions with respect to investments already made.”  
Since this ruling caused uncertainty in the tax credit investor market as to how 
to structure HTC transactions, the IRS responded with publishing safe harbor 
guidelines in 2013. These guidelines state how HTC transactions need to be structured 
in order to avoid auditing. Although, many tax attorneys and real estate professionals 
who work with HTCs feel the guidelines are not specific enough. A report from 
Faegre Baker Daniels states: 
Although the historic tax credit industry has anxiously awaited this IRS 
guidance, this safe harbor may have little benefit until investors and 
developers have greater certainty as to how to comply with its requirements—
and how such compliance will affect investor pricing. Affected practitioners 
and working groups have already set up calls, meetings and conferences to 
discuss this safe harbor. Hopefully progress can be made in the next month or 
two to turn this into a meaningful safe harbor that can work for project 
sponsors and tax credit investors (Berrie, Callison, Christy, Withoff, 2014). 
 
In essence, this opinion argues that while the safe harbor helps give guidance for 
developers structuring HTC transactions, it may take some time for lawyers and HTC 
experts to come to a consensus on how to interpret some of the more ambiguous rules.  
 Despite these criticisms of the current HTC requirements, the HTC still 
provides other opportunities to expand its reach. Specifically, the law further 
incentivizes developers by allowing them to combine HTCs with other tax credits. 
The additional tax credits that can be added to the capital structure of a historic 
renovation project include the state historic tax credit, the new markets tax credit, the 
low-income housing tax credits, and the façade easements credits (Indictor, 2013, p. 
27). Although, the addition of these tax credits complicates the financial structure of 
the project, it also provides a substantial subsidy for developers. For example, the 
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ability to combine these tax credits with the historic tax credit has specifically 
increased the development of moderate- and low-income housing (Frish, 2012). 
Developers who otherwise would avoid building rent-regulated housing have a 
significantly greater incentive to do so by combining multiple tax credits. This feature 
prevents the historic tax credit from pooling money away from other housing projects 
(like low-income housing) and instead helps to promote multiple housing types across 
different markets.  
Due to the historic tax incentives available to developers, historic renovation 
projects can provide sound returns to developers and investors. Kathleen Fitzpatrick 
Hoffelder (2003) from the National Real Estate Investor discusses the trending tenant 
demand for architecturally unique housing, and in her discussion she claims that due 
to the tax incentives, returns can exceed those from other real estate asset classes. 
Projects like the $9.5 million renovation of a former Portland Evening Telegram 
building were only made possible due to the $2 million raised in historic tax credits 
(Hoffelder, 2003). Yet, the developer is still subject to the normal risks associated 
with the real estate market and its levels of supply and demand. An increasing supply 
of renovated historic buildings can eventually surpass demand and erode the 
premiums initially provided by the historic tax credits (Hoffelder, 2003). 
 
D.  Benefits of Developing Historic Renovations  
 Much of the available research covers the indirect benefits of historic 
renovations, such as tourism, housing values, and conservation of a town’s heritage. 
While some researchers, like state historic institutions, have attempted to quantify the 
economic benefits of historic renovations, most of the benefits are simply assumed. 
This section will include the current research and discuss the benefits that historic 
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renovations have on their communities, sustainable housing practices, and how 
historic renovations contribute to the field of architecture. 
 Beyond the project’s returns, historic renovations provide a number of indirect 
benefits to their local communities. Rachel Bacon (2013), a city planner in Columbia, 
Missouri, writes about a study conducted in 2010 that measured the economic benefits 
of Columbia’s historic renovations recorded in the last 10 years. The research showed 
that more than 950 jobs were created and for every dollar of tax credit provided, $4.40 
of private investment was stimulated (as cited in Bacon, 2013).  In addition, the report 
found that the town’s heritage tourism and downtown housing values increased 
significantly, and that the amount of demolition of existing structures had diminished 
(as cited in Bacon, 2013). While the numbers specifically pertain to the town of 
Columbia, they are paradigmatic of the economic benefits historic renovations have 
on their local community. Local communities may even view their historic renovation 
projects as town landmarks, or buildings with significant historic and sentimental 
value. Ernest Yamane (2006), an architect in California, sees landmark buildings as 
structures that resemble a town’s character and legacy; therefore, the preservation of 
these buildings can help further develop a town’s sense of community and identity 
and encourage more growth. 
Historic renovations also create room for sustainable initiatives to be 
implemented. Michael S. Wishkoski (2006) discusses his work developing historic 
renovations while meeting LEED standards.3 He argues that historic renovations are, 
by definition, sustainable buildings because they are given a new purpose and reused 
                                                          
3 LEED, or Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design, “provides independent, third-party 
verification that a building, home or community was designed and built using strategies aimed at 
achieving high performance in key areas of human and environmental health: Sustainable site 
development, water savings, energy efficiency, materials selection and indoor environmental quality” 
(Katz, 2012). 
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rather than demolished and added to the waste stream (Wishkoski, 2006).  
Furthermore, some preserved and unique features of a historic renovation can help 
contribute to its eco-friendliness. For example, Wishkoski discusses how the original 
windows from the Cobb Building (Seattle, WA) were large enough to naturally 
increase ventilation and enhance the amount of daylight emitted into the building. The 
capabilities of the original historic windows helped the Cobb building achieve LEED 
certification. A historic building’s original, eco-friendly features can help the 
developer both achieve sustainability and accomplish their historic renovation efforts 
(Wishkoski 2006). 
Historic renovations also prove important to preserving historic architecture 
and contributing to contemporary architecture. Jorge Otero-Pailos (2012), an architect 
and professor of historic preservation at Columbia University, argues that 
contemporary architecture can develop from historic preservation projects because of 
the unique opportunity to fuse together newer and older architectural styles. Many 
historic renovation projects require new roofs, reinforcing beams, or other 
construction add-ons to support the existing, rehabbed structure. As a result, architects 
are able to incorporate some unique and contemporary designs while maintaining the 
historical significance of the building (Otero-Pailos, 2012). Otero-Pailos describes 
this process as an “architectural echoing,” where architects remove unhistorical 
elements of a building to replace them not with replicas, but with new elements that 
freshly complement the existing historic design. Historic renovation projects provide 
opportunities to advance the field of contemporary architecture while carefully 
preserving historic architecture. 
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E.  Conclusion 
The literature currently available promotes the development of historic 
renovations by discussing the economic and environmental benefits, the importance 
of tax credits in incentivizing the preservation of America’s historic buildings, and 
some unique costs and challenges related to past historic renovation projects. Yet, the 
existing research lacks information regarding the typical benefits, costs and time-
related elements of the historic renovation development process. In addition, the 
available sources lack coverage of developers’ attitudes and strategies regarding the 
challenges of historic renovation developments and HTC transactions. Therefore, my 
case study and series of interviews with developers helps contribute to the existing 
research by identifying the risks, challenges, and benefits of historic renovations 
subsidized with HTCs from the perspective of the developers themselves.  
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III.     OVERVIEW OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Recently, following the Great Recession, the multifamily sector has received 
substantial attention from real estate developers and investors. Many macro and 
micro-economic factors have driven the recent demand for multifamily (for rent) 
housing, specifically Generation Y demographics (individuals born between 1979 and 
1995). Nevertheless, developing multifamily historic renovations requires a sound 
understanding of real estate development in general. This section will provide an 
overview of the development process, the decision-making process, and the timing of 
capital funding. 
 
A.  The Development Process 
 Real estate development is an entrepreneurial activity that is inherently risky 
with low barriers for entry, and most developers spend time and money on planning 
and other due diligence before fully committing to a project. Most development 
projects take a few years to complete, and the developer is subject to all of the local 
unexpected market changes that can happen during those few years. This section will 
discuss the three main phases of the development process: predevelopment, 
development, and close-out. 
 The first, or predevelopment, phase of the development process begins with 
the developers’ idea for a project and the creation of a master plan for how their 
project will unfold. This phase typically makes up 5% – 14% of total costs. Charles 
Long (2011) describes the predevelopment phase as “when all the most important 
ideas behind the project concept and plan are created and refined, and the time when 
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the most important decisions are made” (p. 8). During this initial phase, developers 
have to address two issues: if the project will be a profitable venture, and if they have 
the capital needed to get the project to the financing stage in order to build it (Long, 
2011, p. 7). If those conditions apply, the developer has a number of steps to follow: 
(a) acquire the land; (b) design the project; (c) secure financing; (d) obtain approvals 
and permits. The level of success achieved in these predevelopment steps is very 
important, because it directly impacts the potential success of the following two 
phases. Only after the developers determine that a project is financially viable and 
marketable, they can secure financing, and they have received approval from the local 
municipality, can they continue onto the next development stage.  
 The second stage, development, carries the majority of a project’s cost 
(typically 80% – 90% of total costs), because it involves constructing a new building 
or rehabilitating an existing one. Most likely, the project’s construction costs are 
financed with a construction loan determined by the amount of estimated construction 
costs gathered in the predevelopment stage. Although, due to unexpected issues or 
challenges that arise during actual construction, the development phase carries risk 
that needs to be managed by the developer. Long (2011) writes, “assuming that the 
developer has competently managed the predevelopment tasks, the risks in the 
development stage are mostly controllable through competent management and 
funding of the construction process” (pp. 9 – 10). Long outlines some of the common 
issues that arise during the construction process of the development phase: 
 “Unexpected site conditions” – Poor soils or hazardous waste may be 
discovered by the construction crew.  
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 “Unexpected increases in material costs” – Material costs can change over 
time during the development process. Therefore, careful monitoring of 
material costs can help developers acquire better prices. 
 “Unwieldy and costly design” – A design with many different floor plans, for 
example, can lengthen the construction process. Careful and efficient design 
that takes potential costs into account during the predevelopment stage can 
mitigate this risk. 
 “Change in market conditions” – Because markets are not static and projects 
often take a few years to complete, markets can change considerably during 
that time. Developers can minimize this risk by reassessing the market before 
construction and making back-up plans in preparation of potential market 
changes (2011, p. 10).4 
Long goes on to say: 
To avoid these types of problems, a developer must engage the services of 
competent professionals, including architects, contractors, engineers, 
attorneys, marketing experts, property managers, and financial experts. 
Creating and managing a team with a sense of common purpose is critical to 
success (2011, p. 10).  
 
 The last phase, close-out, carries the smallest portion of costs (typically 5% –
10% of total costs) and occurs when the project has been completed or is near 
completion. This phase includes activities such as marketing, leasing/selling, and 
property management (Long, 2011, p. 10). The pace at which a project leases up and 
the developer’s ability to phase out the project are both very important.5 Phasing out 
the project helps alleviate the capital carrying cost by bringing in cash flow at an 
                                                          
4 Heading and Italics are Long’s, and the bulleted body paragraphs are paraphrased from Long’s list. 
5 By phasing out the project, the developer builds completed portions of the project at a time, allowing 
for leasing or selling of the completed buildings while the others are still being built. 
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earlier point in time.6 The lease-up rate, or selling rate of a project, is also critical, 
because a fast rate will provide the owner/developer of the project with a more 
substantial amount of cash flow to help offset the capital carrying costs of the project. 
Many multifamily projects are phased for this reason, and marketing efforts are taken 
seriously to maximize the lease-up rate of a building.  
 
B.  The Predevelopment Decision-Making Process  
 The decision making process during the predevelopment phase is key to 
developing a site successfully. When developers determine feasibility, they do not 
merely calculate the present value of a project and assess its profitability; they decide 
whether the development idea is a good fit for the land and if it will meet the needs of 
the local market (Graaskamp, 1972, p. 515). This section will provide an overview on 
determining a project’s viability. 
 A feasibility study should determine whether a development idea (new 
construction or renovation) is viable or not. Miles (2000) describes how feasibility is 
met:  
 A project satisfies Graaskamp’s definition of feasibility if the value (adjusted 
for risk) exceeds the total cost, where the total cost includes all the logistics as 
well as all the items necessary to satisfy the legal, physical, and ethical rules 
and where the developer commands the financial and human resources 
necessary to bring the project to fruition (p. 355). 
 
The breadth and depth of the feasibility study depends on the project. Miles (2000) 
writes, “Depending on the size and complexity of the development, the feasibility 
study can vary dramatically in length, scope, and cost” (p. 338). Feasibility studies 
will be more extensive for larger and more diverse projects or for project types that 
                                                          
6 Carrying costs are the holding costs of inventory that has not been sold or leased yet. In development, 
carrying costs refer to the costs of holding unoccupied space during the construction and close-out 
period.   
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are new to a market. Usually the feasibility study is paid for by the developer in the 
predevelopment stage. Therefore, developers must decide what level of feasibility 
testing will be sufficient for their project and will be within their budget.  
 A formal feasibility study usually consists of the following: (a) an executive 
summary; (b) a market study; (c) maps; (d) pictures of the site; (e) renderings; (f) 
estimation of cost; (g) potential financing terms and sources; (h) government 
considerations; (i) value estimation (Miles, 2000, p. 338). The market study is 
typically the most important part of the feasibility test and should take into 
consideration the “long-term global, national, regional and local trends” that would 
affect the absorption of the project (Miles, 2000, p. 340). These trends typically 
include market demographics like age, education level, household incomes, 
population, and the current and projected economic conditions. In addition, the 
developer must analyze the features and functions of existing comparable properties 
(Miles, 2000, p. 340-341). An analysis of the current offerings of comparable 
properties will help the developer understand tenant preferences and the current 
market. For example, if multifamily comparables equipped with pet spas and dog 
parks are able to charge premium rents, then developers may wish to add some of 
those features to their own project design plans. Developers must also put together 
projected absorption schedules for their project’s market segment to order to indicate 
what number of units at a given price over a given time period “will the target market 
be likely to absorb” (Miles, 2000, p. 341). By gathering this specific data from 
comparable properties, developers can estimate what their expected rents and 
absorption rates will be for their projects.  
 The developer also needs to ensure the financial feasibility of a project. 
Financial feasibility is met when a project’s discounted future cash flows sufficiently 
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exceed the project’s expected costs. By using rental rates and operating expenses 
provided by comparable properties, the developer can create a pro forma with an 
estimated net operating income for the intended holding period.7, 8 The operating cash 
flow (net operating income less debt service) and the residual value (expected sales 
price less outstanding debt) are then discounted by a rate of return. For regional 
projects, developers can determine the rate of return by looking at the returns of past 
projects and then adjusting those rates for inflation and additional differences in 
market changes or risks (Miles, 2000, p. 355). The developer should confirm their rate 
of return with investors seeking returns from similar projects (Miles, 2000, p. 355). 
The discounted cash flows (consisting of operating cash flow and residual value) for 
the intended holding period will provide a net present value of the project. This net 
present value must exceed “all the projected costs of the development” in order for the 
project to be feasible (Miles, 2000, p. 360).  
 Construction bids the developer receives from general contractors in the 
predevelopment phase often determine the projected costs of the development. 
Because markets change during the project’s development, developers regularly 
update their feasibility study and market analysis. Therefore, the feasibility study 
should provide a cost sensitivity analysis where the developer can freely adjust the 
estimated costs to see how they affect the internal rate of return (IRR) and the present 
value of the project. This scenario-based cost analysis allows the developer to better 
                                                          
7 A pro forma is a financial statement prepared by the developer in order to estimate a project’s 
expected net operating income and involves assuming figures like gross income and operating 
expenses. 
8 The holding period is the length of time that the developers plan to maintain their stake in the project, 
which usually is the length of time a project is held by a developer/investor until it is sold to another 
owner. 
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understand the risks associated with his/her project costs and derive the projected total 
costs as accurately as possible. 
 When the projected costs of the development are too high or surpass the value 
(the present value of discounted cash flows) of the project, then the developer needs 
to find additional sources of capital that have little or no cost to acquire. For example, 
because historic renovations often incur costs that exceed their expected value, 
developers seek to acquire federal historic tax credits to cover the additional costs. 
Construction contingencies allocate a fixed amount of capital for unexpected 
additional costs that may occur during construction. However, in the event that costs 
exceed the contingency amount, the developer will need to acquire additional capital, 
which adds substantial risk to the project. Therefore, the developer’s feasibility 
analysis needs to take into account all potential increases in costs to determine if 
additional capital may be needed to fund the project.  
  
C.  Timing of Capital Funding  
 The timing of capital funding varies between the different phases of the 
development process. Overall, to fund a project, the developer uses capital from 
equity and debt sources. This project funding, or capital stack, usually consists of 20% 
-- 60% equity and 80% -- 40% debt (Long, 2011, p. 32).9 Equity funding is capital 
provided by a project’s equity investors who are formed together in “a joint venture or 
partnership agreement” (Long, 2011, p. 43). Debt during the development process 
usually takes on the form of a construction loan, and debt financing following project 
completion is typically a permanent loan.  
                                                          
9 The capital stack may also include mezzanine debt (Long, 2011, p. 32). See page 32 of Long’s book 
for a full explanation of mezzanine debt. 
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 During the predevelopment phase, when a developer is conducting feasibility 
studies and designing the project, cumulative investment is rather low (see Figure 
3.1). The developer typically pays for these early predevelopment tasks. As the 
project proceeds through the predevelopment phase, the cumulative investment begins 
to rise, often due to greater expenses like due diligence efforts and design. During 
predevelopment, the developer gathers equity capital for the project, obtains 
entitlements, and secures a construction loan (debt financing). The spike in 
cumulative investment during predevelopment occurs at the end of the 
predevelopment stage when the land is purchased and secured. Although the 
construction loan (debt) is secured at the beginning of construction, construction loan 
lenders typically require equity to be invested in the project first.10 Therefore, the 
developer will apply the equity capital to acquire the land and cover the beginning 
construction expenses. Once the equity has been invested into the project, the project 
can begin drawing from the construction loan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Lenders want to see that there is a substantial amount of equity already present in the project to offset 
any loses that could occur during the project’s lifetime. 
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Figure 3.1  Timing of Capital Funding of a New Construction Project 
 
Figure 3.1 Timing of capital funding (shown as cumulative investment) of a new construction project.  
Adapted from Dr. Lynn Fisher’s class: “The Real Estate Development Process MBA 854 and MBA 
854A” at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 
 Month 40 in Figure 3.1 could be a realistic point in the development process 
where the equity is used up and the project begins drawing from the construction loan. 
Most construction loans are provided by banks to finance construction costs, or “hard 
costs.” These lenders require regular debt service payments and “developer 
guarantees that are secured by recourse to the developer’s assets” (Long, 2011, p. 30). 
Lenders typically disperse the construction loan in “draws” in order to make sure that 
the developer is on track with the project’s construction progress. The construction 
loan covers most of the project costs in this stage including development fees. In 
addition, the construction loan will often be large enough to cover its own interest 
payments. Debt financing usually requires an adjustable loan rate (e.g. LIBOR + a 
spread) that is lower than the return required by equity partners. Lenders typically 
charge a lower cost of capital than equity partners since the lender is the first to 
receive the property’s cash flow through regular debt service payments. Equity 
investors are subject to the remaining cash flows after debt service has been paid. This 
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lower position in the return waterfall creates more risk for equity investors and 
accounts for the greater return that they require.  
 As construction winds down, the project may begin pre-leasing. For projects 
that are phased, leasing will begin while construction of other unfinished units 
continues. When lease-up begins (see Figure 3.1), the majority of the cumulative 
investment has been utilized with a few expenses remaining (e.g. amenities, 
landscaping). During lease-up, the developer/owner focuses on reaching stabilization. 
Stabilization is achieved when the building reaches stable occupancy (typically 90 –
95% for multifamily). At this point, the developer seeks to either sell the property or 
obtain a permanent loan to pay off the construction loan and possibly equity partners 
(investors). The developer’s hope is that the difference between cost of development 
and the value of the completed project is large enough that the debt can be paid off, 
the investors can receive their full principle and preferred returns, and some money 
will remain for the developer and investors’ promotional returns.  
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IV.     FEDERAL HISTORIC TAX CREDITS 
 In 1977, U.S. Congress introduced financial incentives for historic renovation 
developers with the Tax Reform Act. With this bill, lawmakers intended to spur a 
revival of America’s urban centers by incentivizing private development and 
investment with a tax credit. The current version of the bill provides two quantities of 
tax credits, a 20% tax credit and a 10% tax credit, each with different rehabilitation 
qualifications. This thesis will focus will review the requirements and benefits of 
obtaining a 20% historic tax credit, which is more common. In the following 
paragraphs, I rely on an article by Penny S. Indictor who refers to the Internal 
Revenue Code 47 when discussing the requirements and approval process for 
obtaining historic tax credits. 
 
A.  Qualified Rehabilitation Expenditures 
 Historic tax credits (HTCs) are determined by the amount of qualified 
rehabilitation expenditures (QREs) that a developer incurs when renovating a 
qualified rehabilitated building. The building qualifies if it, at some point, had been in 
use prior to rehabilitation and the developer substantially rehabilitates it. To be 
considered as substantially rehabilitated, the building’s QREs must exceed either the 
adjusted basis of the building or $5,000, whichever is greater. In other words, 
developers planning to use HTC tax credits must ensure that the total renovation costs 
will exceed the acquisition price of the land and the existing building (Indictor, 2013, 
p. 18). Otherwise, they will not receive HTCs. The QREs being considered must 
occur during a 24-month period indicated by the developer, but in cases where the 
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renovation will be completed in phases, a 60-month period may be used. In order to 
qualify for the longer period, developers need to show that the renovation process will 
realistically take longer than 24 months (Indictor, 2013, p.19).    
Penny Indictor (2013) lays out the requirements for qualifying expenditures: 
 To constitute a QRE, an expenditure must be chargeable to capital account for 
property for which depreciation is allowable under Section 168 and which is: 
(1) nonresidential real property; (2) residential rental property; (3) real 
property that has a class life of more than 12.5 years; or (4) an addition or 
improvement to property or housing described in items 1, 2, or 3 (p. 19). 
 
Indictor also lists out the specific items from Treas. Reg. § 1.48-12(c)(2) which states 
that QREs can include (a) hard construction costs (walls, partitions, floors, ceilings, 
windows, doors, HVAC systems, plumbing pipes and fixtures, stairs, elevators, 
sprinkler systems and chimneys); (b) interest and taxes during construction period; (c) 
architect fees; (d) engineering fees; (e) construction management costs; (f) reasonable 
developer fees (p. 19). The costs that do not qualify as QREs are (a) land/building 
acquisition costs; (b) costs to expand the existing building or build new buildings; (c) 
site work expenses (like sidewalks, landscaping, parking spaces); (d) and personal 
property expenses (p. 19).11 In addition, property directly owned by a tax-exempt 
entity prevents the entity from receiving HTCs unless the owner claims the property-
generated income as taxable income unrelated to their tax-exempt activities.  
 
B.  Approval Process 
 The approval process for obtaining HTCs is a three-stage process. The first 
two stages occur during the predevelopment process. The first stage consists of 
establishing the building’s eligibility for generating HTCs. The building can satisfy 
this requirement by either being “individually listed in the National Register of 
                                                          
11 This is also a paraphrased list of Indictor’s paraphrase of IRC § 47(c)(2)(B). 
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Historic Places or be located in a ‘registered historic district’ and certified by the 
Secretary of the Interior as being of historic significance to such district” (Indictor, 
2013, p.18).   
 The second stage consists of the National Park Service evaluating the 
building’s proposed renovations prior to construction. The National Park Service 
(NPS) together with State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO) evaluates the 
building on the basis of the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation.12 
The NPS and SHPO provide feedback and any additional stipulations that they feel 
the developer must meet to receive HTCs.  
 During the third stage, NPS and SHPO inspect the building after its 
renovations have been completed. If all completed renovations are in compliance with 
the proposal approved by NPS and SHPO in stage two, then the developer may be 
granted the 20% HTC. In addition, a certificate of occupancy may also be needed to 
indicate that the QREs have officially been placed in service, at which time the 
developer/owner may receive the HTC installment (Indictor, 2013, p. 20).  
  
C.  How and When to Use Historic Tax Credits 
 Developers who do not have the income to fully use the tax credit or are in 
need of cash to cover renovation expenses can look to monetize the HTC. Monetizing 
the HTC involves finding a tax credit investor. Tax credit investors include c-
corporations, banks, insurance companies, and high net worth individuals.  A tax 
credit investor will provide equity for the developer’s project in exchange for the use 
of tax credits. The developer will partner with the tax credit investor in either a 
limited partnership (LP) or a limited liability corporation (LLC). The LP or LLC must 
                                                          
12 See Appendix B for the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation. 
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either own the building or have a long-term operating lease on it. The tax credit 
investor will receive the HTCs after NPS deems the project to be substantially 
completed (part three of HTC process).  
 Developers can find tax credit investors to invest in their projects directly, or 
go through a tax credit syndicator. Tax credit syndicators are brokers who find HTC 
investors and facilitate the transaction. These brokers often charge a fee, or demand a 
cut for their services. Tax syndicators like the National Trust Community Investment 
Corporation (NTCIC) require developers to have part two of the tax credit approval 
process completed before they can close on the tax credit investment (Federal Historic 
Tax Credit Basics, para. 3). Syndicators like the NTCIC may take up to 90 days to 
close on the tax credit investment from the moment they receive the developer’s 
application showing part two completed (Federal Historic Tax Credit Basics, para. 3). 
The value of the HTCs may vary depending on the amount of expected HTCs being 
monetized, the timing of the equity payments, and the ownership structure between 
the developer (general partner) and the tax credit investor. Because the time-value of 
money principle determines the amount of equity received for every dollar of HTCs 
generated, the developers will receive less equity the sooner its needed in the 
development process.13 For many projects, equity received per one dollar of tax credit 
range between $0.80 and $0.90 (Historic Rehabilitation Associates, LLC).14 
                                                          
13 The time value of money principle is based on the concept that a dollar received today is worth more 
than a dollar received tomorrow. The sooner you receive that dollar, the greater earning potential it has 
(e.g. investing it); therefore, one will pay more for a dollar received today than a dollar received 
tomorrow. 
14This transaction works because developers typically don’t need HTCs but instead need cash to help 
fund their project. Large institutions and other tax credit investors desire HTCs to offset their income 
tax liability. Therefore, the tax credit investor benefits by often paying less than the dollar value of the 
tax credit, and developers benefit by receiving cash to help fund their projects. If the developer needs 
the equity from the HTC investor immediately to fund project costs, then the developer will receive 
less equity per dollar of HTCs generated by the project. 
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 The developer determines the timing of the tax credit investors’ equity 
contribution to the project, which is priced into the monetization of the HTCs. For 
example, if the developer needs the full amount of the tax credit investor’s equity to 
receive approval for a construction loan, then the developer will require the potential 
tax credit investor to put forth their equity contribution as soon as possible; in this 
case, the tax credit investor will bear more risk. As a result, the amount of equity 
received for HTCs will be less for projects that require the tax credit investor’s equity 
contribution earlier in the project’s development.  
A more common method of receiving the HTC equity is obtaining a bridge 
loan from the construction lender. A bridge loan for a given project works as follows: 
the developer establishes a contract with a tax credit investor to deliver HTCs in 
exchange for equity. In order to maximize the amount of equity received, the 
developer agrees to receive the HTC equity only after HTCs have been delivered 
(which is when the project has been deemed substantially complete by NPS). The 
developer must then find a construction lender who will lend the expected tax credit 
equity amount in the form of a bridge loan. The developer receives a bridge loan after 
the construction loan has been dispersed, and the developer repays the bridge loan 
with interest when he/she receives the HTC equity. As a result, the developer receives 
the expected HTC equity in advance while still maximizing the amount received.  
 Given that the government only issues HTCs after the renovated project has 
been substantially completed and approved by NPS, tax credit investors must wait to 
receive the tax credits until they file their taxes for the year that the building was 
substantially completed. For example, if the building was substantially completed July 
of 2009, then the earliest that a tax credit investor can claim HTCs would be spring of 
2010. 
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D.  Structuring Transactions 
 When developers enter into a joint venture in the form of an LP or LLC with 
the tax credit investor, these partnerships are part of a larger ownership structure that 
typically comes in two forms: the single-tier structure and the multi-tier lease 
structure. The single-tier structure is the less common, although simpler ownership 
structure in which the building is owned by the joint venture (see Figure 4.1). The 
developer becomes the general partner of the LP or LLC, acting as the managing 
member and operator of the property while the tax credit investor becomes the limited 
partner/investor member. The developer, as a general partner, typically holds a .01% 
interest in profit or loss in the investment put forth by the tax credit investor. The tax 
credit investor is allocated 99.99% of the profit or loss generated by the partnership’s 
interest. The single-tier structure is relatively simple because the joint venture entity 
(comprised of the developer and tax credit investor) directly owns the building, 
performs renovation work, and collects tenant rents. As a result, the tax credit investor 
is a direct owner of the building and receives depreciation benefits.  
Figure 4.1  Single-Tier Tax Structure 
 
Figure 4.1 Single-Tier Tax Structure. Adapted from CityScape Capital Group, LLC. CityScape Capital 
Group. Retrieved from http://www.cityscapecapital.com/htctransactionalstructures.php 
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 The multi-tier lease structure is more common and more complicated than the 
single-tier tax structure (see Figure 4.2). Somewhat similar to the single-tier structure, 
an affiliate of the developer (but not the developer) and the tax credit investor form a 
LP or LLC in which the developer’s affiliate becomes the general partner with 
typically a 0.01% share of the profit and loss, and the tax credit investor becomes the 
limited partner with a 99.99% share of profit and loss. The joint venture holds a long-
term master lease on the building which makes the LP or LLC partnership the leasing 
company. Above the leasing company is the building ownership entity, which is 
managed by the developer who performs the renovation work.15 Tenants pay rent to 
the joint venture leasing company who in turn pays rent to the building ownership 
entity. The tax credit investor holds a long-term operating lease with the building 
ownership entity and is unable to receive the deprecation benefits that the single-tier 
structure provides. The inability to receive deprecation benefits can reduce the amount 
of equity that the tax credit investor is willing to provide in exchange for HTCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The project’s other equity investors are also owners of the building ownership entity. 
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Figure 4.2  Multi-Tier Tax Structure 
 
Figure 4.2 Multi-Tier Lease Structure. Adapted from  CityScape Capital Group, LLC. CityScape 
Capital Group. Retrieved from http://www.cityscapecapital.com/htctransactionalstructures.php 
 
E.  Recapture 
 The Internal Revenue Code lists certain conditions that could cause a 
recapture of a building’s historic tax credits. A recapture means that the government 
has decided that the building has violated an HTC requirement and demands a certain 
amount of the tax credit to be returned. Recapture can only occur during the five year 
period after the renovated building is placed into service. The recapture amount is 
prorated for every year, so if a building has violated a recapture stipulation three years 
after being placed into service with two years left in the period, 40% of its HTCs will 
be recaptured (Indictor, 2013, p. 21). Charles A. Rhuda III (2011), a CPA with 
Novogradac & Company, lists the specific events that would warrant a recapture of 
HTCs during the first five years of service: 
1. “The building is sold; 
2. “The building ceases to be ‘business use property;’ 
3. “A partner disposes greater than two–thirds of its interest; 
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4. “The National Park Service (NPS) removes the building from the National 
Register; 
5. “The NPS determines the building no longer contributes to a Registered 
Historic District, or; 
6. “The building is destroyed by a casualty.” 
If any of these events were to occur within the first five years of the building being 
placed into service, then the HTCs would be recaptured at the prorated amount. 
 Events that would not result in recapture include (a) a transfer of ownership 
between spouses, including resulting from divorce; (b) a transfer of ownership due to 
the owner’s death; (c) when the form of the business entity changes (as long as the 
building retains its business purpose); or (d) a transfer due to a business’ 
reorganization that is tax-free (Rhuda III, 2011). 
 
F.  Historic Boardwalk Hall Case 
 A recent 2012 decision made by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on 
a case called the Historic Boardwalk Hall created a cloud of uncertainty for 
developers, investors, and accountants engaging in the financing of HTCs. The case 
involved the New Jersey Sport and Exposition Authority (NJSEA) who undertook a 
$90 million renovation of the Historic Boardwalk Hall building in Atlantic City, NJ. 
The NJSEA received funding for the project in its entirety but decided to apply for the 
historic tax credits and grant them to an investor who funded their development fees 
(Historic Boardwalk Hall, 2012). The company Pitney Bowes became the tax credit 
investor for Historic Boardwalk, contributing $16.4 million to the project (Anderson, 
2013). The IRS audited the transaction and prohibited the allocation of the HTCs to 
Pitney Bowes; in return, the NJSEA brought the dispute to Tax Court where the court 
ruled in favor of Pitney Bowes (Historic Boardwalk Hall, 2012). 
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The IRS appealed the ruling, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the Tax Court’s decision. The Third Circuit decided that Pitney Bowes was 
not entitled to the HTCs generated by Historic Boardwalk Hall project because 
“Pitney Bowes did not have a clear stake in the economic success of the 
development” (Anderson, 2013). The developer of Historic Boardwalk Hall structured 
the deal in order to mitigate Pitney Bowes’ risk in the project.16 The developer’s 
structuring included a number of guarantees for Pitney Bowes which included the 
delivery of HTCs, a fixed 3% priority return, and a “call” option (strike price) not 
indicated by fair market value (Historic Boardwalk Hall, 2012). The call option meant 
the developer had a right to purchase the tax credit investor’s ownership for the 
greater amount of either 99.99% of the fair market value or any remaining unpaid 
preferred return (Jacobs, 2013). These guarantees effectively minimized the risk that 
Pitney Bowes held in the project, but the Third Circuit saw the guarantees as proof 
that Pitney Bowes did not share in the downside risk or upside potential of the project 
(Historic Boardwalk Hall, 2012). As a result, Pitney Bowes lost entitlement to the 
project’s HTCs. Since then, this ruling on Historic Boardwalk Hall has created 
uncertainty about how to properly structure HTC transactional agreements and, as a 
result, now has the potential to limit the pool of HTC investors. 
 The Historic Boardwalk Hall case also scrutinized the amount of development 
fees for historic renovations. Up until the recent ruling on the Historic Boardwalk Hall 
case, historic renovation developers could charge development fees of 12% – 20% of 
total project costs, although they would typically collect only a portion of the fee (e.g. 
                                                          
16 Mitigating a tax credit investor’s risk in a project has sometimes been common practice for 
developers acquiring HTC equity. 
34 
 
4% – 5% of project costs) and leave the remaining fee as deferred.17 The development 
fee for Historic Boardwalk Hall was approximately 15% of total project costs and was 
fully financed with 70% of the HTC equity provided by Pitney Bowes (Milder, 2011). 
The developers of Historic Boardwalk Hall received the entire 15% development fee 
through the form of HTC equity (that is, none of the fee was deferred). This case 
sheds light on potential moral hazard in the context of HTC regulation if the majority 
of the HTCs generated from a project are used to pay such high development fees. 
 In response to the uncertainty caused by the Historic Boardwalk Hall decision, 
the IRS issued the Guidance for HTC transactions in late 2013 to serve as a safe 
harbor for investors and developers of historic renovations. The Guidance applies to 
partnerships structured as either a Developer Partnership or a Master Tenant 
Partnership (Roberts, 2014).18 In Appendix C, I summarize the safe harbor guidelines 
from three sources: the Rev. Proc. 2014-12, an overview from Charles E. Roberts, and 
an overview from Winthrop and Weinstine, and I include responses to this guidance 
in my interview section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The IRS typically allows higher development fees for historic renovations, because most developers 
collect only a portion of the fee (e.g. 4-5% of total project costs) and leave the remaining development 
fee deferred (e.g. 6-7% of total project costs). Deferred development fees are not intended to be 
collected by the developer as compensation but instead allow historic renovation developers to increase 
their QRE basis and receive a greater amount of HTCs in order to make the project financially feasible. 
18 The Developer Partnership refers to the single-tier structure and the Master Tenant Partnership refers 
to the multi-tier lease structure. 
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V.     METHODOLOGY 
My research methodology consists of a series of interviews with historic 
renovation developers and real estate professionals along with a case study that 
displays the costs, funds, and timeline of an actual historic renovation. With this 
methodology, I analyze the types of risks, challenges, and benefits associated with the 
development process of renovating historic buildings into multifamily communities. 
The following section will discuss the interviews, the case study, and the case study’s 
justification and limitations. 
 
A.  Interviews 
The interview section includes information from six real estate professionals 
(see Table 5.1). Three of the interviewees are real estate developers (including the 
developer of the case study project) who have experience with both new construction 
and historic renovation projects. Of these three developers, two have developed 
multifamily historic renovation projects. These three developers are valuable 
contributors to my research because of their extensive experience and expertise. I also 
interviewed a general contractor who has experience in constructing multifamily 
projects for both new construction and historic renovation projects. The fifth 
interviewee is a real estate consultant who specializes in structuring transactions 
involving subsidies, including historic tax credits, and the sixth is the property 
manager of the case study project who provided insight into the operations of a 
historic renovation. 
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Table 5.1  Descriptions of Each Interviewee  
Interviewee Occupation Expertise Experience 
Interviewee #1 Developer Urban and mixed use 
historic renovations using 
historic tax and New 
Markets Tax Credits 
Managed the 
redevelopment planning of 
over 2 million sq. ft., has 
over 20 years of 
experience in real estate 
and finance and developed 
the case study project 
Interviewee #2 Developer Development of luxury 
suburban apartments and 
historic renovations 
Over 30 years of 
experience in multifamily 
industry 
Interviewee #3 Developer Development of both 
commercial and 
residential properties 
including historic 
renovations 
Over 30 years of 
experience in real estate 
development  
Interviewee #4 General 
Contractor 
Managing construction of 
new multifamily and 
historic renovation 
projects 
Over 15 years of 
experience in construction 
and engineering 
Interviewee #5 Real Estate 
Consultant  
Structuring transactions 
involving historic tax 
credits with investors and 
syndicators 
Over 18 years of 
experience in finance and 
accounting 
Interviewee #6 Property 
Manager 
Historic renovation 
property management 
Property manager of case 
study project 
 
I asked the interviewees a series of questions referring to their personal 
experience in development in order to understand some of the risks, challenges, and 
benefits they incurred on past historic renovation projects. This process took the form 
of a semi-structured interview in which a list of questions was derived from specific 
topics, and the interviewee had the freedom to go beyond just answering the question 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Below is a list of topics that I addressed during the 
interviews:  
 Costly and lengthy development tasks during the pre-development, 
development, and close-out phases of historic renovation projects 
 Significant costs unique to historic renovations 
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 Institutional buyers’ attitudes toward multifamily historic renovation projects, 
valuations of historic renovations, and how developers search for the right 
institutional buyer 
 The historic renovation developer’s relationship with the community/local 
government as well as the historic societies 
 The approval process for obtaining federal and state historic tax credits and the 
cost and time implications associated with the approval process 
 The difference in “soft costs” between historic renovations and new 
construction projects 
 Risk mitigation throughout the development phases  
 Marketing strategies like determining the right target market of tenants for a 
historic renovation project 
By interviewing developers who work on both types of projects, I identified the risks, 
challenges and benefits unique to historic renovations that neither my literature 
review nor my case study revealed. As noted, I also interviewed the developer and 
current property manager of the project I used in the case study. The information from 
these interviewees provided additional insight into the case study and its unique 
challenges.  
 
B.  Case Study  
The case study features data from an actual historic renovation project. This 
data enables me to compare the historic renovation development process to that of a 
new construction project. By doing so, I identify what risks were apparent in the case 
study project and the implications of those risks (e.g. significant costs and/or lengthy 
tasks).  
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The data presented comprises of the:  
 Project overview 
 Project costs and financing 
 Yield on cost 
 Timeline of development (predevelopment, development, and close-out) 
 Additional challenges 
 Operations 
 
C.  Case Study Justification  
Since my case study utilizes the data from only one historic renovation, my 
study is only a glimpse into the larger picture of the types of financing, the costs, and 
the development timeline associated with multifamily historic renovation projects. 
Nevertheless, the case study substantiates the risks described in the interview section 
and therefore helps to provide an example of some of the major risk-related 
differences between a historic renovation and a new construction project.  
 
D.  Case Study Limitations 
Because of the sensitive nature of publishing data from real estate investments, 
I rounded the numbers used for figures like costs, loan amounts, and equity 
contributions. Despite this limitation, the study remains accurate, since most of these 
numbers are in the millions. Another limitation concerns some of the project’s 
elements—like the timing of capital and its uses; these were approximated since some 
information was not available or documented in detail. Lastly, some aspects of the 
project, like its market conditions and additional sources of capital, were unique to the 
case study and not typical of other historic renovations. For example, most historic 
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renovations are not 60% subsidized (as this project was); instead, they tend to be 
roughly 20% – 40% subsidized if they use only federal and state HTCs. I address the 
case study’s limitations by providing background and contextual information about 
the project in order to avoid making unsubstantiated comparisons to new construction 
projects.  
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VI.     INTERVIEWS 
 This section incorporates the views and opinions of developers and real estate 
professionals regarding the risks of historic renovations. In the following sections, I 
paraphrase the comments of the interviewees and supplement them with a few 
academic sources and my own analysis. I collect, combine, and organize the interview 
responses into sections that outline four types of risk associated with historic 
renovations financed with federal historic tax credits: regulatory risk, tax credit risk, 
general development risk, and operational risk.  
 
A.  Regulatory Risk 
 The approval process for acquiring federal historic tax credits (HTCs) for 
historic renovations carries regulatory risk. By seeking eligibility for HTCs, the 
developer unequivocally partners with the federal government under very specific 
stipulations, which include adhering to a federal agency’s timetable. For example, 
regulatory risk occurs in the predevelopment stage when a developer is establishing 
eligibility to receive HTCs. Establishing eligibility usually takes between three to six 
months and may require registering the building with the National Register of Historic 
Places. Only after eligibility has been established may the developer seek approval for 
the design plans. Designing the renovation, presenting the renovation plans to the 
government, and receiving feedback and additional preservation requirements usually 
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takes another three to six months. These two steps add six to twelve months to the 
traditional development timeline, subjecting the project to more market risk.19  
 The obligation to meet the preservation requirements by the National Park 
Service (NPS) and the State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO) also adds risk to 
the development process.20 In order to receive approval for their renovation design 
plans and be in a position to receive historic tax credits, the developer must agree to 
the preservation requirements made by the NPS and the SHPO. This step carries risk 
because, up until the point of design approval, the developer does not know the exact 
preservation stipulations the NPS and the SHPO will require. These stipulations often 
state which original fixtures must remain (e.g. industrial equipment), which specific 
architectural elements of the building must be preserved authentically (e.g. windows), 
which parts of the building must be rebuilt (e.g. roof), and which structural elements 
may be added (e.g. walls, walkways). Such preservation stipulations may be 
challenging for developers to implement, may increase total development costs, and 
may lengthen the development timeline.  
Often times, the NPS and the SHPO’s preservation requirements limit a 
developer’s design options. For example, an NPS and SHPO stipulation that requires 
original fixtures to remain may limit the amount of revenue-producing square footage. 
The developer is then tasked with designing floor plans that will adhere to the useable 
square footage and preservation requirements, while at the same time, ensuring the 
project’s design will remain economically feasible and desirable for the end user. As a 
result, with a historic renovation, the developer may have a plethora of 
                                                          
19 As the development process lengthens, the project’s market conditions can deviate from the 
developers’ initial market research.  
20 SHPO approval is required if the project is utilizing state historic tax credits. The amount of state 
historic tax credits per dollar of QREs depends on each individual state’s policy. 
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unconventional floor plans for each unit type in order to maximize rentable square 
footage. In contrast, a new construction project typically has only three to five floor 
plans for each unit type which helps streamline the building process and cut costs.  
NPS and SHPO stipulations that require particular elements of a building to be 
preserved in a certain way can add substantial costs to the developer. NPS may 
require a developer to preserve or reconstruct elements of a building using specific 
materials. As a result, the developer will need to spend additional time and money 
buying the required materials, possibly hiring historic preservation/construction 
specialists, and preserving or reconstructing those certain elements of the building. 
Such work further increases the total additional renovation costs. Depending on the 
degree of preservation required by the NPS and the SHPO following a design 
approval, a developer’s total project costs may be significantly more than originally 
estimated. 
The regulatory risk continues throughout the development process. As 
construction proceeds, structural issues may be discovered, and developers may need 
to make appropriate changes in the building’s design. Such changes, if significant 
enough, require the NPS’s attention and approval. For example, the restoration of an 
old conveyor belt during the construction phase of a historic renovation project 
required the NPS’s guidance and approval. This process took an additional six weeks 
and added $60,000 in costs to the project. Overall, the NPS will collaborate with 
developers to find a design solution that lies within the preservation parameters, but 
the amount of time and money required to arrive at and implement this solution 
carries greater risk compared to traditional development. 
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B.  Tax Credit Risk 
 The final ruling on the Historic Boardwalk Hall case caused many developers 
and investors of HTC-funded projects to be fearful of an audit from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). While the IRS provides guidance in Revenue Procedure 
2014-12 (released 2013) on the proper way to structure HTC transactions and avoid 
audit, some of the guidelines create new challenges for developers (see Appendix C 
for a summary of Rev. Proc. 2014-12). For example, the safe harbor guidelines do not 
permit the developer to have a call option to purchase the investor’s interest in the 
project. Rather, the developer must rely on a put transaction (a future price set by the 
investor) to occur, which limits the developer’s ability to “buy out,” or purchase the 
interest of his/her investors. As a result, developers may have less control over their 
future interest in the project and may be discouraged from developing historic 
renovations altogether. To help overcome this limitation, developers are 
recommended to partner with investors who they trust and/or are likely interested in 
investing in HTC transactions in the future (Winthrop & Weinstine, 2014). 
Developers are also limited by the HTC recapture conditions. The five year 
recapture period, which begins when the building has been substantially completed, 
prevents the developer from selling the building to another owner. In other words, the 
original tax credit investor must remain as an equity owner and not allow his/her 
equity interest to drop more than 33% during that five year period. To compensate for 
this limitation, the Rev. Proc. 2014-12 allows for a “flip” where the equity investor, 
after five years of the building being in service, can reduce his/her interest to 5% of its 
highest amount. Since most tax credit investors hold a 99.99% interest in their LP or 
LLC, their interest can be reduced to a minimum of 4.95% over the life of the deal, 
five years after the building has been placed into service. Nonetheless, the five year 
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recapture period limits historic renovation developers by requiring them to execute 
long-term exit strategies, thereby making their projects more susceptible to market 
changes. 
The IRS safe harbor guidelines also create some ambiguity regarding 
appropriate development fees for historic renovations. Until recently, development 
fees for historic renovations financed with HTCs ranged between 12% – 20% of total 
project costs. In comparison, historic renovations not financed with HTCs typically 
incur development fees of 4% – 5% of total project costs, and those for new 
construction projects typically range between 3% – 4%. While a historic renovation 
could demand a development fee up to 20% of total project costs, the developer 
would collect a smaller portion of it (usually 4% or 5% of total project costs) and 
leave the remaining amount as a deferred development fee. The safe harbor guidelines 
state that development fees for HTC-funded projects must now be supported by 
comparable projects not financed with HTCs, which is difficult given the uniqueness 
of each historic renovation project. This new stipulation will likely cause historic 
renovation development fees to decrease, potentially falling to a range of 10% – 12% 
of total project costs.  Although, in order to meet the guidelines, developers must 
provide documentation of development fees from comparable properties and 
determine the best and/or highest development fee amount that the IRS will deem 
permissible.   
  Often, when a historic renovation developer is applying for a construction 
loan, the lender will require that the tax credit investor’s equity contribution be 
secured. The syndication process of applying for and securing a tax credit investor, 
along with the legal fees, adds to the project’s costs and lengthens the developer’s 
project timeline. In addition, if the developer secures the construction loan but the 
45 
 
construction lender will not provide a bridge loan, then the developer will likely need 
the tax credit investor to contribute his/her HTC equity into the project before HTCs 
are actually generated; this transaction reduces the amount of HTC equity the 
developer receives. 
 
C.  General Development Risk 
Every historic renovation project is different, and every project has its 
surprises. This section will discuss some of the general historic renovation 
development risks that differ from those of conventional projects.  
A historic renovation’s soft costs will vary from those of conventional 
projects; soft costs differences include: 
 Government approvals tend to be cheaper for historic renovations because 
most municipalities encourage them. 
 Financing a historic renovation project is much more complicated than a 
conventional project when acquiring equity and debt. 
 Lenders tend to charge more for historic renovations than for conventional 
projects. 
 Leasing and marketing costs are relatively the same for both types of projects. 
 Legal costs are higher for historic renovations. 
 Historic renovations incur registration and certification costs. 
 Historic renovation design takes slightly longer than conventional project 
design and therefore may cost more. 
 Historic renovations incur higher consultant costs because of the greater need 
for specialized expertise. 
I discuss some of these soft costs in greater detail in the following sections. 
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A building’s natural layout can limit its renovation design, presenting a risk to 
the building’s desirability to tenants. For example, if a building is too wide, then a 
multifamily developer may need to build deep, narrow units which are atypical of 
conventional multifamily unit floor plans. If a building has small windows, then a 
developer may need to build low bedroom walls that do not reach the ceiling in order 
to meet fire codes and allow light to travel through the unit. These design limitations 
may require the developer to build units that are less desirable for potential tenants. 
Nevertheless, multifamily housing is typically one of the easier uses for converting 
old buildings. Industrial buildings and mills are often ideal for multifamily housing, 
because they often have large interior floor space that is compatible with creating 
numerous unit floor plan designs.  
While not soft costs, asbestos abatement and lead-based paint removal are 
often needed for historic renovations prior to beginning construction and can be very 
expensive and time consuming. If a building has a high amount of harmful pollutants, 
decontamination may take as long as a year. This process carries the risk of spending 
additional development money before renovations begin.21 
While some significant historic renovation costs may be expected during the 
predevelopment phase, some problems are not detected until renovations begin. Such 
unexpected problems can be costly and time consuming, and, as stated in the last 
section, may require changes to the design plan and approval from the NPS. For 
example, a construction team may begin refilling 100-year-old brick walls with new 
mortar and in the process dislodge bricks and pieces of the wall. The team is now 
faced with the potentially troublesome situation which may not only include a 
                                                          
21 Decontamination may start while the developer is undergoing the renovation design, legal, and 
financing processes (as done in the case study project). Although, conducting asbestos abatement and 
lead paint removal during these processes is not typical. 
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structural problem, but require finding a solution that is compatible with the 
preservation efforts of the building. If the problem is serious enough, the developers 
may need to reassess their design plans with the NPS before continuing the 
development process. 
 
D.  Operational Risk 
Historic tax credits add a unique risk to a historic renovation because they can 
be recaptured if the property management or the owner fails to maintain the 
preservation standards. During the first five years following substantial completion, 
any alterations to the building need to comply with the NPS’ original preservation 
standards that were agreed to in stage two of the original application process. For 
example, in the case study, the buildings’ original windows were poor insulators, 
generating higher energy costs and causing tenants to complain about the temperature 
in their units. Nevertheless, NPS required the original windows to remain affixed to 
the building. The owner/property manager would have preferred to replace the 
windows with ones that were more insulated and energy efficient, but doing so would 
have caused a recapture of the building’s HTCs. As a result, the property manager 
decided to wait to change out the windows until the five year recapture period was 
over. Only a property manager who is familiar with managing historic renovations 
and is aware of his/her building’s preservation standards can mitigate the risk of HTC 
recapture during the first five years of operations. 
Tenants of historic renovations must also abide by the NPS preservation 
stipulations during the recapture period. Tenants cannot alter their units in any way 
that would conflict with the building’s preservation requirements for HTCs. For 
example, NPS preservation stipulations may prohibit tenants from drilling holes or 
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painting over their unit’s brick wall. These stipulations create the element of risk that 
tenants may not adhere to the property’s preservation requirements. Therefore, 
property managers of historic renovations need to inform tenants of the historic nature 
of the property, draw up contracts for the tenants to sign, and monitor the property 
throughout the recapture period. 
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VII.     CASE STUDY 
The case study features an actual historic renovation project composed of two 
buildings that were converted to multifamily housing. This section will provide an 
overview of the project, its cost and financing, yield on cost, the timeline of 
development, additional challenges, and operations. 
 
A.  Project Overview 
 The multifamily historic renovation project I analyze in this case study 
comprises of 70 units across 105,000 sq. ft. at a total cost of $440/sq. ft. The project’s 
overall statistics are outlined in Table 7.1. This project’s submarket is a relatively 
small, disinvested urban area. The project was part of a master redevelopment plan of 
a former tobacco factory dating back to the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Two facts must be noted for this case study: First, in addition to using historic 
tax credits, the project uses New Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs). The NMTCs are 
granted to projects in disinvested areas or qualified low-income areas. In addition, 
projects in these areas must satisfy the requirements for a qualified active low-income 
business (QALICB) classification. For every $1.00 of equity or debt invested into a 
QALICB, $0.39 of NMTCs is generated which can be monetized and used as equity 
to fund the project’s costs. Second, the developer in the case study dedicated a small 
portion of the project as commercial space in order to receive NMTCs, since this is a 
requirement for eligibility. For the purpose of this case study, the NMTCs and the 
commercial space will not be covered in great detail. Yet, they suggest the possibility 
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that some historic renovations may require multiple sources of subsidies to make them 
financially feasible.  
Table 7.1  Case Study Project Statistics  
Size of Land 3.0 Acres 
Number of Residential Units 70 
Residential sq. ft. 105,000 sq. ft. 
Commercial sq. ft. 20,000 sq. ft. 
Total Investment $55,000,000 
Total Cost per sq. ft. $440/sq. ft. 
Types of Tax Credits Used Federal and State Historic Tax 
Credits, New Markets Tax 
Credits 
  
B.  Project Costs and Financing 
 The total project costs for the renovation of the two buildings were 
$55,000,000 (see Table 7.2). 22 The estimated total project costs for the residential 
portion of the project were $46,200,000. To provide a comparison, the total project 
costs of a new construction project that was developed around the same time as the 
case study project in a nearby submarket was around $40,000,000 and was roughly 
290 units.  The majority of the case study project’s total costs were financed with 
federal HTCs, state HTCs and NMTCs (see Table 7.3). Debt and equity together only 
financed 38% of total project costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Includes the costs for developing the 20,000 square feet of commercial space 
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Table 7.2  Total Project Costs  
Types of Costs Budget 
Acquisition $   2,500,000 
Construction (Hard Costs) $ 34,000,000 
Architectural/Engineering $   3,000,000 
Leasing and Marketing  $      500,000 
Organizational/Professional $   1,000,000 
Financing $   3,500,000 
Carrying Costs (Taxes & Int.) $   2,500,000 
Development Fees $   8,000,000 
Total Project Costs $ 55,000,000 
 
Table 7.3  Financing 
Sources of Project’s Funds  Dollar Amount Percentage  
Debt $16,000,000 29.09% 
Equity (provided by development firm) $  5,000,000 9.09% 
Tax Credit Equity (HTC and NMTC) $34,000,000 61.82% 
Total Project Costs $55,000,000 100% 
 
 Out of the case study’s total project costs, $47,500,000 (roughly 86% of total 
project costs) were QREs (see Table 7.4). The development fee, which made up 
almost 15% of the total project costs, contributed to the QRE basis. A third of the 
development fee (5% of total project costs) was collected and the remaining fee was 
deferred. 
Table 7.4  Qualified Rehabilitation Expenditures 
Types of Costs Dollar Amount 
Hard costs $  34,000,000 
Architectural/Engineering $    3,000,000 
Taxes and Interest $    2,500,000 
Development Fees $    8,000,000 
Total QREs $  47,500,000 
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C.  Yield on Cost 
 The project produces an annual NOI of $935,550 using the case study 
project’s expected rent per square foot of $1.35.23 Given the total project costs per 
square foot of $440, the yield on cost for the case study project is approximately 
2.03% (see Figure 7.1). Total project costs per square foot for new construction 
projects tend to range between $100 and $180. In Figure 7.1, I provide an example 
showing the NOI and yield on cost for the residential portion of the case study project 
as compared to the specs of building the same project new. Building the same project 
new produces a yield on cost of approximately 7.43% which shows that the project is 
feasible if cap rates are 150 to 200 basis points lower (cap rates of 5.43% to 5.93%).24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 The NOI calculation assumes a vacancy rate of 5% and operating costs that are 40% of Potential 
Gross Income (PGI). 
24 A cap rate, or capitalization rate, is a method of valuing income producing properties. See Long, 
2011, p. 35 for a full explanation.  
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Figure 7.1  Yield on Cost Comparison Between the Case Study Project and a New   
Construction Project  
 
Yield on Cost Example 
Assumptions: 
Vacancy is 5% of PGI
Operating Costs are 40% of PGI
Historical Renovation New Construction
Number of Multifamily Units 70 70
Total Rentable Square Feet (Residential) 105,000 105,000
Cost Per Square Foot 440$                                120$                         
Total Project Cost (Residential) 46,200,000$                    12,600,000$             
Potential Gross Income (PGI) 1,701,000$                      1,701,000$               
     Rent per square foot 1.35$                            1.35$                     
Vacancies 85,050$                           85,050$                    
Effective Gross Income (EGI) 1,615,950$                      1,615,950$               
Operating Costs 680,400$                         680,400$                  
Net Operating Income (NOI) 935,550$                         935,550$                  
Yield on Cost 2.03% 7.43%  
Figure 7.1 Yield on cost analyses are conducted to determine project feasibility. Usually, the calculated 
yield on cost less 150 – 200 basis points indicates the cap rate needed to make the project feasible. For 
the new construction project in this example, a cap rate of approximately 5.5% – 6.0% would be 
needed to make it feasible. The historic renovation’s yield on cost is so low that a practical cap rate 
cannot be achieved; therefore, subsidy is needed to make the historic renovation project feasible. An 
important point to note is that the yield on cost for the new construction is lower than many other new 
construction projects since the number of multifamily units being developed is rather low (70 units). 
Most new construction multifamily projects are 100+ units in order to achieve a higher yield on cost. 
 
D.  Timeline of Development 
 The case study project’s entire development timeline spans five years (see 
Table 7.5 and Figure 7.2). The predevelopment stage lasted from year one to the end 
of year three. In year one, the developer signed an option agreement with the current 
owner to purchase the two buildings. From that point on until the end of year three, 
the developer conducted due diligence on the two buildings, drew up the buildings’ 
designs, and worked on securing equity and debt financing. In the second half of year 
two, the developer completed the historic tax credit application and syndication 
process to secure the tax credit investor. Soon after, the developer began some hard 
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costs renovation work, including some demolition, asbestos abatement, and lead-
based paint removal for the two buildings.  
During the predevelopment stage, the developer spent about $7 million on the 
tasks listed above and financed them with the development firm’s equity as well as a 
line of credit provided by a large institutional investor. This line of credit resembled a 
two year, interest-only loan and was granted before the project received a construction 
loan because of the investor’s strong business relationship with the development firm 
and its understanding of the historic renovation process. In most historic renovations, 
hard cost renovations do not begin when a project is still under contract and the 
construction loan has not yet been received. Nevertheless, because of the relationship 
between the developer and the investor, the developer was comfortable with using the 
investor’s line of credit to begin renovating the two buildings rather than waiting for 
the construction loan. The developer received the line of credit in the beginning of 
year three which was to be repaid once the construction loan was acquired at the end 
of year three. 
By the beginning of year four, the developer closed on the construction loan 
and officially purchased the two buildings. Because the construction loan only 
covered a portion of the budgeted costs, the developer needed to cover the remaining 
costs with the equity from the expected HTCs. The developer funded the remaining 
costs with a bridge loan provided by the institutional investor.25 The bridge loan 
amount consisted of the expected HTC equity the developer would receive once the 
project was substantially complete and HTCs were delivered.  
                                                          
25 Historic renovation developers may use bridge loans to receive the expected HTC equity in advance, 
but unlike this case, bridge loans are usually provided by the project’s construction lender. In return, 
the lender would be paid back with the HTC equity received by the developer (after the project is 
substantially complete and HTCs are delivered to the investor). 
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As renovations proceeded into year five, the project’s renovations coincided 
with the beginning of the Great Recession. The development firm had difficulty 
paying existing debt from other projects and therefore began missing payments for 
this project. As a result, the project was foreclosed by the construction lender, and the 
lender took ownership of the two buildings. By that time, both buildings had already 
begun leasing and were substantially complete. 
Table 7.5  Development Timeline for Case Study Project 
Year Development 
Stage 
Tasks Completed Sources of Funds 
1 – 2.5  Predevelopment   Signed option 
agreement to 
purchase buildings 
 Began due diligence  
 Developer’s equity 
2.5 – 3 
 
 Completed part one 
and two of HTC 
application 
 Partnered with tax 
credit investor  
3 – 3.5  Performed asbestos 
abatement, lead 
paint removal, and 
demolition(Note) 
 Tax credit investor 
line of credit (10% 
interest rate) 
 
3.5 – 4  Purchased 
buildings/land  
 Acquired 
construction loan 
 Tax credit investor 
line of credit  
(10% interest rate) 
 Additional 
developer’s equity 
4 Development   Renovated building  Construction loan 
(6.5% interest rate) 
5 Development 
 
 Continued 
renovations and 
began leasing 
 Construction loan 
 Bridge loan on tax 
credit equity (10% 
int. rate) 
Note. Most historic renovations do not begin asbestos abatement, lead paint removal, or demolition 
before the building is actually acquired. This particular project is an exception. 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Figure 7.2  Case Study Project’s Timing of Capital Funding 
 
Figure 7.2 Because of the asbestos abatement and lead paint removal that was conducted in the case 
study project’s predevelopment phase, the amount of capital invested in its predevelopment stage was 
more than most historic renovations. Yet, the project’s other expensive soft costs that are typical of 
historic renovations help explain why the case study project’s predevelopment stage was more capital 
intensive than that of a new construction project shown in Figure 3.1 (see Appendix A for a direct 
comparison). 
 
 
E.  Additional Challenges  
During renovation work, the developer encountered some major structural 
issues with Building #2. The oldest wing of the building was in very poor structural 
condition, so the developer had to unexpectedly reconstruct and reinforce that section 
of the building. As a result, renovations for that section of the building were delayed, 
and the costs for the reconstruction added about $3.5 million to the budget. 
 
F.  Operations 
Once the two buildings began leasing up, the property manager needed to 
ensure that tenants and maintenance would adhere to the NPS’s preservation 
standards for the first five years following substantial completion. For example, when 
new tenants signed leases, the property manager had them sign an additional form that 
explained the historic significance of the property and which specific acts were 
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prohibited (e.g. no painting the brick walls). In addition to ensuring that tenants would 
respect the historic nature of the building, the property manager also needed to 
monitor any minor renovations or updates to the buildings so they would adhere to the 
NPS’s preservation standards.  
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VIII.     RESULTS 
 This section will discuss the results derived from the case study and the 
interview section. These results are organized into the challenges and benefits of 
developing historic renovations in comparison to new construction projects. 
 
A.  Challenges 
Historic renovation projects tend to have higher total costs per square foot than 
new construction projects and therefore require subsidies (HTCs) to make the project 
feasible. 26 The case study had a total cost per square foot of $440 whereas new 
construction projects typically range between $100 and $180 per square foot. 27, 28 
Some elements inherent to historic renovations drive up the costs per square foot. The 
existing layout of a historic building limits the design of multifamily floor plans 
which may reduce the layout’s efficiency. A developer may need to design more 
unconventional floor plans and settle on a less desirable mix of unit sizes. Also, 
depending on the integrity of a historic building, the building may require structural 
work and frame reinforcement. Such construction work can drastically increase costs 
and delay the renovation progress, a problem that occurred with Building #2 in the 
case study. Certain NPS preservation stipulations, like the conveyor belt example 
                                                          
26 See Figure 7.1 in the case study for a yield on cost example showing the need for subsidies for 
historic renovation projects. 
27 The case study had cost overruns which increased the cost per square foot to $440 and is on the 
higher end of historic renovation costs. 
28 The costs per square foot for new construction range depending on the project’s location, size, and 
materials used. 
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provided in the interviews, may be costly and difficult for the historic renovation 
developer to meet. In addition, historic renovations often require asbestos abatement 
and lead paint removal prior to renovation work, which adds time and additional costs 
to the development process.  
Historic renovations have a longer and more expensive predevelopment stage 
than new construction projects, so the developer incurs greater financial risk. The case 
study’s timing of capital funding graph shows a greater amount of capital invested in 
the predevelopment stage than in comparison to a new construction project (see 
Appendix A).29 This difference is largely due to the time and money needed for 
completing the HTC application and syndication process as well as conducting 
comprehensive due diligence. This due diligence may include hiring contractors early 
in the process as well as historic and environmental consultants in order to determine 
a sound rehabilitation cost estimate of the existing buildings. The legal structuring 
required for tax credit transactions and syndication processes also drives up the total 
costs of legal fees for historic renovations. If the historic renovation developer uses 
additional subsidies, like NMTCs present in the case study project, these soft costs 
will increase even more. 
Financial engineering is also required for historic renovations that generate 
HTCs.  Because HTCs are delivered at time of substantial project completion, 
developers will likely need to work with a construction loan lender who will provide a 
bridge loan (or other financial engineering devices) to cover remaining project costs 
until the developer receives HTC equity. The case study project was financed with an 
unorthodox bridge loan since it was provided by an institutional investor. Since a 
                                                          
29 Other historic renovations may not have as costly a predevelopment stage as the case study project 
since the developer began some hard cost renovation work.  
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bridge loan is secured by the expected HTC equity, which carries additional risk, the 
number of lenders willing to finance a construction loan and provide a bridge loan is 
limited. The amount of time needed to reach substantial completion will also affect 
the value of equity realized from HTCs. Delays in reaching substantial completion 
will cause delays in delivering HTCs to investors which may result in penalties and/or 
less HTC equity. Ultimately, this limitation puts increased pressure on the developer 
to deliver the project on time.  
A historic renovation may have a riskier construction stage than a new 
construction project. Unlike new construction, due diligence for a historic renovation 
includes assessing the entire building, and if any structural issues are undiscovered, 
they will be found during construction. As in the case study, $3.5 million worth of 
structural work for Building #2 was not discovered until mid-renovation. To 
compensate for higher construction risk, a construction lender may charge a higher 
interest rate for a historic renovation project. A higher interest rate increases the 
project’s total costs and places a greater constraint on developers to pay bills related 
to the project. Also, historic renovation design changes made during construction 
must be brought to and approved by the NPS. The amount of time the NPS takes in 
deciding how to implement the design change can complicate and delay the 
development process. In addition, depending on the significance of the design change, 
the NPS’s requirements can add additional costs to the construction budget.   
Historic renovations financed with HTCs have a more inflexible and limited 
exit strategy than new construction projects. The historic renovation developer must 
maintain original ownership for five years following substantial completion in order 
to avoid recapture of HTCs. Therefore, a developer cannot plan to sell the asset and 
benefit from potential capital gains until the five year recapture period has ended. This 
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inflexibility creates risk for developers and requires them to forecast market 
conditions more than five years into the future as opposed to only two or three years 
for projects not financed with HTCs.30 As a result, an HTC-funded historic renovation 
is exposed to more potential changes in market conditions which directly impacts its 
feasibility. The developer may then have more difficulty finding investors who will 
accept the longer investment holding period. In addition, historic renovations in 
downtown areas may be smaller projects which reduces their appeal to institutional 
investors who are looking to purchase large 200+ unit multifamily assets. In the case 
study, the investor/owner who renovated the first phase of the tobacco factory planned 
to purchase the two buildings from phase two (and eventually did). This arrangement 
mitigated the risk posed by the historic renovation’s limited exit strategy. In addition, 
due to a lack of scale, smaller projects have higher costs of management and 
maintenance which reduces their NOI and valuation. Finally, due to recent IRS 
guidelines, the historic renovation developer using HTCs can no longer have a call 
option to buy out the HTC investor’s ownership. This IRS stipulation limits the 
developer’s ability to control the future partnership of the project and obtain greater 
ownership in the historic renovation. 
Historic renovation developers require a network of real estate professionals 
(architects, attorneys, engineers, general contractors, and lenders) who understand the 
development process of historic renovations because of the specialized renovation 
needs and the regulatory risk and tax credit risk associated with historic renovations. 
Therefore, historic renovation developers must rely on a smaller pool of real estate 
                                                          
30 Typically, the further into the future a developer has to forecast market conditions, the less accurate 
his/her forecast will be. A developer’s forecast of future market conditions is a key determinant of 
whether or not to undertake a project.  
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professionals which creates more risk for the developers' project and limits their 
ability to hire professionals at competitive prices. 
The uncertainty of the IRS guidelines creates the additional risk of auditing 
when structuring HTC transactions with an investor. Historic renovation developers 
require an attorney/accountant who is familiar with structuring HTC transactional 
agreements in order to carefully balance the interests of the developer and investor 
with the IRS guidelines. Tax code changes also require that any tax credit investor is a 
bona fide partner in the project, reallocating some of the downside risk and upside 
potential of the project from the developer to the tax credit investor. Because of the 
Historic Boardwalk Hall case, tax credit investors now more thoroughly underwrite 
each potential HTC transaction which lengthens the syndication process and can delay 
the developer’s goal of attaining financing. These and other implications of the 
Historic Boardwalk Hall and IRS safe harbor guidelines complicate the HTC 
transactional process and place further constraints on the developer’s ability to deliver 
a successful project.  
The Historic Boardwalk Hall case has also caused the IRS to restrict the range 
of acceptable development fees. Before the Historic Boardwalk Hall case, historic 
renovations financed with HTCs could demand development fees of 12% – 20% of 
total project costs. Used for increasing the QRE basis, such high development fees 
were permissible given that the developer would collect a development fee of 
typically 4% – 5% of the total project costs and leave the remaining development fee 
as deferred. The case study project provided an example of a development fee that 
was 15% of total project costs, but only a third of that fee (5% of total project costs) 
was collected; the majority and remaining portion of the fee was deferred.  The 
Historic Boardwalk Hall case alerted of the IRS the potential for developers to also 
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collect the deferred portions of their development fee.31 As a result, the IRS now 
restricts development fees to a range of 10% – 12% of total project costs, causing the 
deferred portion of the fee, which helps increase the QREs basis, to be less. This 
stipulation will cause projects to generate less QREs than they did in the past and 
receive less HTCs, making fewer historic renovations financially feasible.  
Property management of historic renovations must abide with the NPS 
preservation standards during the first five years following substantial completion. 
Following substantial completion, the case study project’s property management had 
to adhere to the NPS preservation standards for both buildings and prevent any 
alterations from causing a recapture of HTCs, like replacing the original windows. 
Because the preservation standards prohibited the property manager from replacing 
the buildings’ original windows, the buildings’ heating and cooling systems continued 
to run inefficiently which increased energy costs and caused tenants to complain 
about units being too hot or too cold. In general, NPS preservation standards create 
continued risk for the first five years of a historic renovation project’s stabilized 
operations. 
 
B.  Benefits  
Due to the availability of HTCs and other sources of subsidies, a historic 
renovation project can be financed with a smaller overall portion of equity and debt 
compared to new construction projects. As displayed by the case study, the project 
had a 29% debt-to-cost ratio compared to 60% for most new construction projects. 
Because a historic renovation project can be developed with a lower debt-to-cost 
                                                          
31 The deferred portion plus the collected portion of the development fee could be as much as 20% of 
total project costs. The IRS saw the potential for the misuse of HTCs by developers to subsidize 
projects that did not actually need subsidy and then use the HTCs to pay high-percentage development 
fees. 
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ratio, a successful exit through refinancing or selling can leave a substantial share of 
residual equity available to the investors.32 This lower ratio can generate a greater 
potential IRR and NPV for equity investors and developers to help compensate for the 
greater risk in historic renovation projects. Many historic renovations using HTCs can 
bring down the debt-to-cost ratio even further by acquiring additional subsidies like 
NMTCs as well as municipal and government grants (e.g. city grants and EPA grants 
for brownfield redevelopment).  
Due to the greater risk that developers assume when undertaking historic 
renovation projects, historic renovation developers charge a higher development fee 
than they do for new construction projects. New development typically allows a 
development fee of 3 – 4% of total project costs, whereas historic renovations not 
financed with HTCs typically demand development fees of 4% – 5% of total project 
costs. This 1% premium over development fees from new construction projects can be 
understood as an indicator of the reward developers receive for the additional risk 
they undertake when developing historic renovations. As an example, the case study 
project’s development fee was 15% of total project costs, but the developer only 
collected a fee of 5% of total project costs and left the remaining development fee as 
deferred.33 Developers are more likely incentivized by the 1% development fee 
premium than the potential capital gains from selling the project after the five year 
recapture period. While the IRS recently restricted the development fee amount to a 
range of 10% – 12% of total project costs, developers can still increase their project’s 
QREs with development fees in that range.  
                                                          
32 See Appendix D for a stylized example of a hypothetical historic renovation project showing the 
benefit of a low debt-to-cost ratio.  
33 Since the project was financed with HTCs, the developer could charge a development fee of 15% of 
total project costs with the expectation that a portion of that fee would be deferred. 
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Many cities recognize that renovating historically significant buildings helps 
preserve a community’s unique heritage. As a result, some cities will provide 
developers with grants to help finance historic renovation projects. Since 
municipalities are encouraging historic renovations, the process of obtaining permits 
for historic renovations tends to be less expensive than those of new construction 
projects. A developer may also earn a positive reputation with a community which 
then helps the developer’s future projects with approval processes.  
Historic renovation projects may be structurally stronger and made of more 
durable materials than new construction projects. As a result, many historic 
renovations may have a longer usable life than new construction projects. For 
example, a historic renovation may have another 100 years of usable life whereas a 
new construction project will likely have a usable life of 50 to 60 years. In addition, 
because many potential historic renovations are industrial buildings with large interior 
volumes, they lend themselves easily to multifamily conversion. 
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IX.     CONCLUSION 
This section will discuss the main results found through my methodology. I 
will make some recommendations to real estate developers and policy makers about 
the undertaking and promotion of historic renovations, discuss concerns for policy 
makers to consider, and provide suggestions for future research. 
 
A.  Main Results  
 As demonstrated by my case study and series of interviews, historic 
renovations present a unique set of challenges and potential benefits in contrast to 
new construction projects. The challenges range from the NPS design requirements to 
project development risks. The benefits include potential higher returns and 
development fees as well as greater social standing with the local municipality. A 
developer considering a historic renovation project must weigh the challenges with 
the potential benefits. 
  
B.  Recommendations to Real Estate Developers 
 Developers undertaking historic renovations should consider the following 
recommendations. 
The more thorough due diligence a developer can perform before closing on a 
building, the less unexpected issues he/she will encounter. Typically, the same 
principle is held when a developer is assessing an urban infill project or greenfield 
site, but the complexity of a historic renovation requires more precise attention to 
detail. A historic building will likely have some deterioration, some functional 
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obsolescence, ground contamination, asbestos, and/or lead paint, so a developer needs 
a detailed assessment of how much rehabilitation the building will need before it is 
suitable to occupy. Involving the general contractor early in the predevelopment 
process to thoroughly inspect the building may uncover potential structural issues and 
prove helpful in determining the feasibility of the project.34 In addition, the developer 
needs to thoroughly assess how much historic preservation will likely be required by 
the NPS and have an idea of how much HTC equity the project can demand. Hiring a 
historic preservation consultant to go over the prospective building and identify which 
building elements will likely require preservation can help developers estimate their 
costs and QREs.       
Conducting a more thorough and longer due diligence in the predevelopment 
period requires more money, which is a challenge for many developers who have 
limited working capital. Yet, before the developer begins hiring consultants and the 
general contractor in the due diligence stage, a developer can perform an independent 
assessment of the economic feasibility of a potential project. For example, since the 
history of a building may be the key to discovering its potential hazards and risks, a 
developer can search local records of deeds to learn about its previous uses. 
Depending on how well-known a building is, information like its prior uses, tenants, 
and even building materials may be publically available. A developer may even find 
someone who worked in the building in the past or did maintenance on it and conduct 
an interview about the building. Understanding the present condition and integrity of 
a historic building will likely require a thorough due diligence, but the developer can 
uncover some potential risks by conducting research on his/her own.     
                                                          
34 Typically the general contractor does not officially become involved until the end of the 
predevelopment process when designs have been formalized. 
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Developers undertaking historic renovations also must connect with a pool of 
investors who have long-term goals. In other words, because of the recapture 
stipulations of HTCs, developers need to seek investors who are interested in owning 
a property for at least five years. Finding the right types of long-term investors who 
will invest in historic renovations may initially take some time, but developing a 
strong relationship and track record with those investors can help historic renovation 
developers more easily finance future projects. 
Lastly, a developer must answer three key fundamental questions when 
considering a multifamily historic renovation: (1) is the building structurally and 
functionally compatible for conversion to multifamily units, (2) is there a market for 
multifamily housing where the historic building is located, (3) is the project 
financially feasible (costs + return ≤ value). Although basic, these are essential 
requirements that must be met in order to successfully develop a multifamily historic 
renovation. 
 
C.  Recommendations to Policy Makers 
 Policy makers working in historic communities or involved in the HTC 
process should consider the following recommendations. Policy makers in disinvested 
urban areas should consider budgeting for renovation grants and make them available 
to developers considering historic renovation projects. Since historic renovations 
incur higher costs in the predevelopment stage (e.g. more thorough due diligence, 
HTC application, and syndication process), municipal or state grants can help 
developers who lack sufficient predevelopment capital.   
 I encourage policy makers to make appeals to the IRS to simplify the HTC 
process for developers. Although the recent IRS guidelines help clarify some of the 
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uncertainties caused by the Historic Boardwalk Hall decision, developers and 
investors still cannot easily navigate the convoluted HTC structuring requirements. 
Appeals to the IRS regarding these difficulties and the negative impact they have on 
historic renovations may encourage reform of the historic tax credit process. In 
addition, simplifying the HTC process may make the actual costs of HTC-subsidized 
projects to tax payers more transparent. Policy makers should also ensure that their 
state historic tax credit programs are helping developers overcome the difficulties of 
developing historic renovations. 
 
D.  Concerns for Policy Makers to Consider 
 The Historic Boardwalk Hall case suggests potential for the HTC program to 
be exploited when financing historic renovation projects where no or little subsidy is 
required. From a social outlook, this point raises the question of whether or not HTCs, 
which are federal tax dollars, should help cover such high development fees. 
Although the scrutiny from the IRS guidelines will likely reduce development fees to 
a range of 10% – 12%, the IRS will continue to allow deferred development fees to 
help increase the qualified rehabilitation expenditure basis. As long as the IRS allows 
this practice, developers will utilize this opportunity to increase the amount of HTCs 
their projects generate in order to improve financial feasibility, which creates an 
opportunity for abuse. A more practical and transparent IRS policy might require 
raising the percent allocation of HTCs generated (e.g. 20% of QREs to 25%) and not 
permitting high-percentage development fees.  
Determining which historic buildings should be financed with HTCs presents 
another issue. By further increasing a project’s expected amount of HTCs, the 
deferred development fee practice may encourage developers to financially engineer 
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historic renovations that are extremely costly. Projects that are far from feasibility 
may be poor uses of federal and state subsidy if they produce equal benefits to 
renovations that require less subsidy. For example, if two historic renovations yield 
the same economic benefits, but one can be renovated at a lower cost (and therefore 
less subsidized) then the less expensive historic renovation is a more beneficial use of 
tax payer dollars. This concept can also be applied to the comparison of subsidized 
historic renovations and new construction projects. The case study project, which 
produced 70 residential units, incurred greater total project costs than a nearby new 
construction project that produced approximately 300 units. The developer of the case 
study financially engineered the project to fund nearly 60% of total costs with 
multiple sources of subsidy. Public policy makers need to consider whether the 
economic benefits of renovating historic buildings with multiple sources of 
government subsidy outweigh the costs to tax payers. I would argue that with the case 
study, the two buildings actually help preserve the town’s entire identity and public 
policy makers may not be able to quantify the intrinsic value of some developments, 
but they should consider it when deciding the amount of available subsidy.  
 
E.  Suggestions for Future Research 
I recommend to researchers that they develop several detailed case studies of 
historic renovations to further identify and analyze some of the common challenges 
and benefits among them. I was limited to the number of potential projects for my 
case study, because current real estate projects and investments often keep their 
development data very private. Therefore, I suggest that researchers begin the process 
of acquiring data far in advance, possibly a year or two. In addition, I recommend to 
researchers to analyze whether multifamily historic renovations can demand higher 
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rents per square foot over new construction projects. A study on this topic could 
encourage more developers to undertake historic renovations and would greatly 
contribute to our base of knowledge. 
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APPENDIX A: TIMING OF CAPITAL FUNDING Of A NEW 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT VERSUS THE CASE STUDY PROJECT 
FIGURE 3.1  Timing of Capital Funding of a New Construction Project 
 
Source: Dr. Lynn Fisher’s Class: The Real Estate Development Process 
 MBA 854  AND MBA 854A 
FIGURE 7.2  Case Study Project’s Timing of Capital Funding 
 
Figure 7.2 Because of the asbestos abatement and lead paint removal that was conducted in the case 
study project’s predevelopment phase, the amount of capital invested in its predevelopment stage is 
more than most historic renovations. Yet, the project’s other expensive soft costs that are typical of 
historic renovations help explain why the case study project’s predevelopment stage was more capital 
intensive than that of a new construction project shown in Figure 3.1. 
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APPENDIX B: SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR’S STANDARDS FOR 
REHABILITATION 
1. A property will be used as it was historically or be given a new use that requires 
minimal change to its distinctive materials, features, spaces, and spatial relationships. 
2. The historic character of a property will be retained and preserved. The removal of 
distinctive materials or alteration of features, spaces, and spatial relationships that 
characterize a property will be avoided. 
3. Each property will be recognized as a physical record of its time, place, and use. 
Changes that create a false sense of historic development, such as adding conjectural 
features or elements from other historic properties, will not be undertaken. 
4. Changes to a property that have acquired historic significance in their own right 
will be retained and preserved. 
5. Distinctive materials, features, finishes, and construction techniques or examples of 
craftsmanship that characterize a property will be preserved. 
6. Deteriorated historic features will be repaired rather than replaced. Where the 
severity of deterioration requires replacement of a distinctive feature, the new feature 
will match the old in design, color, texture, and, where possible, materials. 
Replacement of missing features will be substantiated by documentary and physical 
evidence. 
7. Chemical or physical treatments, if appropriate, will be undertaken using the 
gentlest means possible. Treatments that cause damage to historic materials will not 
be used. 
8. Archeological resources will be protected and preserved in place. If such resources 
must be disturbed, mitigation measures will be undertaken. 
9. New additions, exterior alterations, or related new construction will not destroy 
historic materials, features, and spatial relationships that characterize the property. 
The new work shall be differentiated from the old and will be compatible with the 
historic materials, features, size, scale and proportion, and massing to protect the 
integrity of the property and its environment. 
10. New additions and adjacent or related new construction will be undertaken in a 
such a manner that, if removed in the future, the essential form and integrity of the 
historic property and its environment would be unimpaired. 
Source: http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/standguide/rehab/rehab_standards.ht 
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF REVENUE PROCEDURE 2014-12 
 Principles must maintain a 1% interest in each item of Partnership income, 
gain, loss, deduction and credit throughout the Partnership.35, 36  
 Throughout the Partnership, the Investor must hold a minimum interest in each 
item of the Partnership income, gain, loss, deduction and credit; this minimum 
is at least 5% of the investor’s percentage interest in each item for the taxable 
year for which their share is the largest.37 
 The Investor must demonstrate their interest is a bona fide equity investment 
by: 
 Not being substantially protected from the project’s losses  
 Having their future interest determined by the property’s cash flow 
rather than being substantially fixed in amount 
 Sharing the profits from the Partnership and not being limited to a 
minimum or preferred return. 
 The Investor’s ownership interest may not be reduced by the following: 
 Developer fees, incentive fees, management fees, leases that are 
unreasonable compared to similar properties that do not involve HTCs. 
 Disproportionate rights to distributions or options rights for less than 
fair market value. 
                                                          
35 I summarized the safe harbor stipulations from three sources: the IRS Rev. Proc. 2014-12, an 
overview from Charles E. Roberts, and an overview from Winthrop and Weinstine. 
 
36 Principles are presumably considered to be general partners managing the partnership, and investors 
are considered to be limited partners. 
37 Investor in this document pertains to the tax credit investor. 
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 Subleases of the building from a multi-tier lease structure to the developer are 
only reasonable if: 
 The sublease is mandated by a third party unrelated to the principle 
(developer), and 
 The term of the sublease is shorter than the lease from the building 
ownership entity to the leasing company (head lease). 
 The leasing company may not terminate the head lease during the time when 
the Investor is a partner in the leasing company. 
 The Investor must have paid at least 20% of the equity contribution by the 
time the renovation is put into service. 
 At least 75% of the expected equity contribution amount must be determined 
before the building is placed in service. 
 The following guarantees are permitted as long as they are unfunded:38  
 Performance of acts needed to receive HTCs 
 Avoidance of acts that would result in failing to qualify for HTCs or 
causing HTC recapture 
 The following guarantees are impermissible: 
 The investor will obtain HTCs 
 HTC cash equivalent 
 Repayment of the investor’s equity contribution in the event that HTCs 
cannot be obtained or the IRS challenges the transaction 
                                                          
38 Unfunded means no money is allocated to fund the guarantee and there is no agreement to maintain a 
certain net worth of the guarantor. 
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 Partnerships or principles may not have call options to purchase the investor’s 
interest. Investors may have put options, but they cannot exceed the fair 
market value of the investor’s interest at the time the put is exercised.39 
 The investor may not acquire interest in the project if it has plans to abandon 
its interest following the rehabilitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Put options provide investors the option sell their interest at a specific price and future date. 
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APPENDIX D: LTC TO LTV EXAMPLE 
Assumptions:
Project must be held 7 years: 2 year renovation with a 5 year recapture period
QREs are 80% of total project costs
State HTC is a 30% tax credit based on same QREs as federal HTC
Equity (non-HTC) contribution is $6,000,000
The permanent debt acquired at year 3 is same as construction loan amount
Cap rate is at 7% at beginning of year 3 and 7.5% at end of year 7
Property does not generate income until renovations are completed after year 2
Year 3 NOI is $2,380,000 and grows at 2% per year
Permanent loan period is 30 years amortizing at 5.5% interest
State HTCs receive $.50 per $1.00 of credit and federal HTCs receive $1.00 per $1.00
Development 
Total Project Cost 45,000,000$              
     QREs 36,000,000$         
Federal HTC (20% of QRE) 7,200,000$                
State HTC (30% of QRE) 5,400,000$                
Equity 6,000,000$                
Debt 26,400,000$              
     LTC 58.67%
Stabilization (Beginning of Year 3)
Net Operating Income 2,380,000$                
Cap Rate 7.00%
Value of Asset 34,000,000$              
     Value to Cost Ratio 75.56%
Permanent Debt 26,400,000$              
     LTV 77.65%
Debt Payments (Annual) 1,816,462$                
Sale (End of Year 7)
Net Operating Income 2,576,189$                
Cap Rate 7.50%
Value of Asset 34,349,181$              
Remaining Debt Principle 24,365,903$               
 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NOI -$              -$ -$  2,380,000$  2,427,600$  2,476,152$  2,525,675$  36,925,369$   
Debt Service -$              -$ -$  (1,816,462)$ (1,816,462)$ (1,816,462)$ (1,816,462)$ (26,182,365)$ 
Cash Flow to Equity Investors (6,000,000)$  -$ -$  563,538$     611,138$     659,690$     709,213$     10,743,004$   
Equity Investors' IRR 13.09%  
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